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DRUG TESTING: IS PREEMPTION THE ANSWER?
I. INTRODUCTION
The drug testing controversy has been difficult to resolve partly
because the discussions have been tinged with hysteria and extreme
reactions from policy makers and members of the judiciary. Edwin
Meese, Attorney General in the Reagan administration, suggested
that investigators for employers should frequent bars or clubs in
which employees gather after work to see whether there is drug use.'
Robert DuPont, the former director of the National Institute on
Drug Abuse and now a consultant to corporations on drug testing,
has advocated universal, mandatory drug testing, parental drug test-
ing of children, and the use of civil commitment statutes to incarcer-
ate repeat drug users.' Judge Silberman of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, a judge who was reputedly on President Bush's short list of
Supreme Court Justice nominees, called any drug use among Justice
Department prosecutors the equivalent of "an open display of fealty
to Nazi tenets or symbols [during World War II]."' He accused a
judge who disagreed with him of "judicial guerrilla warfare" 4 and
stated that anything less than a full commitment to the drug war
"would risk the nation's survival."
As a reaction to pronouncements such as these and to recent
Supreme Court and appellate court decisions, a number of states
have adopted strategies to protect the privacy rights of their citizens
against what some perceive as increasing federal erosion of these
rights. States which have recognized a right to privacy in their con-
1. Meese Urges Drug Use Watch, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1986, at A17.
2. Robert DuPont, The Case for Mandatory, Universal Drug Tests, WASH. POST, Apr.
16, 1989, at B8.
3. Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Silberman, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
4. Id. at 500.
5. Id. at 497.
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stitutions" are seeing an increasing number of litigants relying on
adequate and independent state grounds in drug testing cases in or-
der to avoid review by the United States Supreme Court.7 By the
end of 1990, eighteen states8 and a number of local governments9
had enacted drug testing legislation to address the problems of inva-
sion of privacy, confidentiality of testing, and unreliable tests.10
Perceiving state legislation as an attempt to undercut federal
drug programs, President Bush publicly criticized some states' drug
testing legislation as "counterproductive." 11 His spokesman said that
6. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22 (1972); ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 1; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6; LA.
CONST. art. 1, § 5; MASS. CONST. art. 14; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. 1,
§ 10; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
7. See KEVIN ZEESE, DRUG TESTING LEGAL MANUAL § 5.01[3][c] (1991).
8. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1025-1026 (Deering 1989 & Supp. 1991); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 31-51aa (1987 & Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 17.565 (1989); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 730.5 (1987 & Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1601(10)(a)-(e)
(1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 681-690 (1992); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.
§ 17-214.1(a)-(e) (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-
19-01 to -10 (1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 438.510 (1987) (licensing); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 813.40, 813.300 (1987) (operation of motor vehicles); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-1 (1988 &
Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 511-520 (1987).
9. See, e.g., BOULDER, COLO., ORDINANCE 5195 (1989); ATLANTA, GA., CODE art. F.
§ 5-3101 (1988); Berkeley, Cal., Resolution No. 54,533 (Oct. 25, 1988); SAN FRANCISCO,
CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE pt. II, ch. VIII, art. 33A (1985).
10. In a House Subcommittee hearing, Rep. Gary Ackerman, Committee Chair, cited a
Journal of the American Medical Association report on a survey that was conducted by the
Center for Disease Control on thirteen private drug testing labs. The survey found error rates
as high as 69 percent. Drug Testing Federal Employees: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Post Office and Civil Service of the House Comm. on Human Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1986) [hereinafter Drug Testing Federal Employees] (statement of Rep. Gary Ackerman,
Chair of the Subcommittee). See also Mark Rothstein, Screening Workers for Drugs: A Legal
and Ethical Framework, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 422, 426-27 (citing Hugh J. Hansen et al.,
Crisis in Drug Testing, 253 JAMA 2382 (1985) (discussing the Center for Disease Control's
study of drug testing laboratories)). Representative Ackerman also noted that the Defense De-
partment had to reconsider punitive actions taken against 70,000 soldiers who had been disci-
plined on drug charges, because their drug tests had been faulty. Drug Testing Federal Em-
ployees, supra.
There are several major causes of inaccuracies. "False or incorrect results can occur because of
chemical, physiological or pharmacological factors, outright errors in the analysis including
instrument malfunctions and mistakes made by analysts, or inherent limitations of analysis
methods." Kurt M. Dubowski, Drug Use Testing Scientific Perspectives, 11 NOVA L. REV.
415, 445 (1987). See also Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Scien-
tific Issues in Drug Testing, 257 JAMA 3110, 3111 (1987); William J. Sonnestuhl et al.,
Employee Injustice in the Workplace, 11 NOVA L. REV. 709, 719 (1987); Walt Bogdanich,
Federal Lab Studying Train, Airline Crashes Fabricated its Findings, WALL ST. J., July 31,
1987, at Al (noting a high level of fabricated and incorrect results at Federal Aviation Admin-
istration laboratory).
11. Bush Raps State Drug Testing Limitations, 5 INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
(BNA) 1 (1990).
DRUG TESTING
Iowa, Montana, Rhode Island, and Vermont were among the states
to which President Bush referred." These four states have passed
laws that prohibit random testing and contain some of the strongest
protections of employee rights in the area of drug testing.' 8
Under President Bush's direction, the Office of National Drug
Control Policy has prepared model state legislation. 4 States have not
been eager to adopt this model. However, federal legislation intro-
duced in the 1990 session of Congress by Senator Orrin Hatch
would have dealt with the problem more directly.' 5 The Senate bill
would have preempted all state drug testing legislation,' 6 and a
House bill would preempt state legislation only in the area of regu-
lation of drug testing laboratories.1
The problem faced by legislators in the drug testing area is the
necessity to carefully balance the needs of employees and employers.
This comment examines whether it is possible to attain that balance
through preemption and proposes a more desirable solution. Section
II explores the background of the problem by looking briefly at ex-
isting federal legislation, United States Supreme Court and federal
appellate court decisions, and state responses to the perceived erosion
of privacy rights.'" This section provides an overview of state legisla-
tion but will focus primarily on the legislation of Iowa, Montana,
Rhode Island, and Vermont, states targeted and criticized by Presi-
dent Bush. 9 Section II also examines the model state legislation pro-
posed by President Bush and the Office of National Drug Control
Strategy and concludes that this model fails to achieve the President's
objective.2" This section also considers proposed legislation that
adopts a direct preemption approach and proposed legislation that
adopts a more limited preemption approach and discusses the im-
plied preemption of a state statute.2 ' Section III considers the inade-
quacies of the proposed legislation and assesses the Iowa, Montana,
Rhode Island, and Vermont drug testing legislation.22 This section
12. Id. at 1.
13. See infra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
14. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, BUILDING A DRUG FREE
WORKFORCE (1990). This publication is available from the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, Executive Office of the President, Washington, D.C. 20500.
15. S. 2695, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
16. Id. § 2611.
17. H.R. 33, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 557(a) (1991).
18. See infra notes 25-164 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 165-82 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 183-225 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 226-83 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 284-302 and accompanying text.
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also rejects preemption of state legislation and state constitutional
safeguards as a meaningful solution to the drug testing problem.2"
Section IV proposes a more desirable solution and more effective leg-
islative provisions in a number of critical areas. 4
II. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Legislation
1. Executive Order 12,564
In 1986, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,564,
which mandates testing of all federal job applicants and all federal
employees in "sensitive positions." 5 As part of the supplemental ap-
propriations bill which Congress enacted to permit the testing con-
templated by the order, Congress required federal agencies to de-
velop drug testing plans.26 In August 1987, the Department of
Health and Human Services (hereinafter HHS) issued guidelines for
collection of specimens, laboratory analysis, chain of custody verifica-
tion, and confirmatory tests. 27 The guidelines set forth detailed qual-
23. See infra notes 303-42 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 343-51 and accompanying text.
25. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986). Sensitive positions are defined
as those handling classified information, those serving as Presidential appointees, those in posi-
tions related to national security, law enforcement officers, those charged with the protection of
life, property, and public health and safety, and those in jobs requiring a high degree of trust
and confidence. Id. at 32,892. The Executive Order authorizes testing under four circum-
stances: (1) where there is reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use; (2) in conjunction with the
investigation of an accident; (3) as a part of an employee's counseling or rehabilitation for drug
use through an employee assistance program; and (4) to screen any job applicant for illegal
drug use. Id. at 32,890.
26. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-71, § 503, 101 Stat.
391 (1987).
27. Scientific and Technical Guidelines for Federal Drug Testing Programs; Standards
for Certification of Laboratories Engaged in Urine Testing for Federal Agencies, 52 Fed. Reg.
30,638 (1987)(proposed Aug. 14, 1987). This dociument sets forth proposed scientific and tech-
nical guidelines for federal drug testing programs and standards for certification of laboratories
that test for federal agencies in accordance with Executive Order 12,564, and § 503 of the
Supplemental Appropriations Act. Pub. L. No. 100-71 requires the Department of Health and
Human Services to publish guidelines in the Federal Register to accomplish the following:
(1) Establish comprehensive standards for all aspects of laboratory drug
testing and laboratory procedures to be applied in carrying out Executive Order
12,564, including standards which require the use of the best available technol-
ogy for ensuring the full reliability and accuracy of drug tests and strict proce-
dures governing the chain of custody of specimens collected for drug testing;
(2) Specify the drugs for which federal employees may be tested; and
(3) Establish appropriate standards and procedures for periodic review of
laboratories and criteria for certification and revocation of certification of labo-
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ity assurance and laboratory proficiency testing measures.2" Dr.
James Mason, the Assistant Secretary for Health, Public Health
Service, Health and Human Services has described the standards as
"state-of-the-art. "29
2. Omnibus Drug Bill 5210 and the Drug-Free Workplace
Act
The massive 1988 Omnibus Drug Bill, House Bill 5210, con-
tained provisions entitled The Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988
which required employers or contractors procuring government con-
tracts of $25,000 or more from any federal agency to certify the
workplace would be drug free.3 ° On May 25, 1990, the Office of
Management and Budget (hereinafter OMB) published final regula-
tions for implementing the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988."' The
questions and answers that accompany the regulations make it clear
that testing is a possible component of the program. 2 An employer
may institute a program consisting of reasonable suspicion and post
accident drug testing, counseling and/or rehabilitation, and random
unannounced testing for employees in health and safety or national
security sensitive positions."3 These regulations do not preempt state
or local laws.3'
B. Union Response
Federal employee unions generally responded to federal drug
testing legislation by filing lawsuits. 5 Red Evans, a spokesman for
ratories to perform drug testing in carrying out Executive Order 12,564.
Id. at 30,638.
28. 52 Fed. Reg. 30,638, 30,644 (1987)(proposed Aug. 14, 1987).
29. Drug Testing Laboratories: Hearings on H.R. 33 Before the Comm. on Health and
the Environment of the Comm. of Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1989)
(statement by Dr. James Mason, Assistant Secretary for Health, Public Health Service,
Health and Human Services).
30. The Drug-Free Workplace Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 4181, 5151 tit. V (D),
102 Stat. 102 (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 701 (1988)).
31. Governmentwide Implementation of the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 55 Fed.
Reg. 21,679 (1990); Department of Agriculture, 7 C.F.R. § 26 (1990); Department of En-
ergy, 10 C.F.R. § 1036 (1990); Department of Commerce, 15 C.F.R. § 26 (1990); Depart-
ment of Justice, 28 C.F.R. § 67 (1990); Department of Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 280 (1990);
Department of Transportation, 49 C.F.R. § 29 (1990).
32. Governmentwide Implementation of the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 55 Fed.
Reg. 21,679 (1990).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 21,687.
35. Judith Havemann, Drug Testing Deadline Won't Be Met Today, WASH. POST,
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the National Federation of Federal Employees, stated: "This has
been a costly effort on the part of all the unions to litigate these
issues case by case.""6 However, the unions felt that the effort was
justified." In testimony before a House subcommittee, Kenneth T.
Blaylock, President of the American Federation of Government Em-
ployees, called the program a "McCarthy-like witch hunt ... which
is morally repugnant and repulsive to a free society,"88 and a spokes-
man for the National Federation of Federal Employees described the
proposal as "smack[ing] of a police state"89 and a "gross violation of
. . . privacy." 40 Although national drug policy director, William J.
Bennett, set January 5, 1990, as the deadline for full implementation
of a certified drug testing plan within the government, plans had not
been fully implemented by that date.' 1 J. Michael Walsh, who over-
sees the federal drug testing program for the National Institute of
Drug Abuse (hereinafter NIDA), attributed some of the delay to le-
gal attacks.' 2 He also acknowledged that "this was clearly a major
public policy that was very unpopular and invoked great uncertainty
even at the highest levels of government." 43
Jan. 5, 1990, at A4.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Post
Office and Civil Service, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1986) (statement of Kenneth Blaylock, Na-
tional President, American Federation of Government Employees). Blaylock was concerned
with the erosion of Fourth Amendment rights, inaccuracy of the tests, and the huge cost of the
drug testing program. He stated that the program "at the minimum would conservatively cost
$54 million, $11 per initial screening with an experience factor of 20 percent testing positive,
and $75 for follow up tests . I..." d  at 32. At the same hearing, Robert Tobias, President of
the National Treasury Employees Union, also protested the prohibitive cost of implementation
of the drug testing program. Using figures from Mr. Claude Buller, President of Compu
Chem, a drug testing company, Tobias estimated that "the cost of conducting a single screen-
ing test for drugs for all federal civilian workers would cost the taxpayers between
$295,019,900.00 and $265,517,910.00." Id. at 45. See also Jane Baird, Firms Mull High
Cost of Drug Tests, Hous. POST, Dec. 31, 1989, at Dl. According to Baird, the Federal
Highway Administration estimated that drugs would cost truck and bus companies $1.7 billion
over the next ten years. Id. Jim Johnson, president of the Owner-Operator Independent Driv-
ers Association of America, stated: "The regulation will be the biggest, most expensive boon-
doggie ever passed down." Id. at D4. Richard Manchester, vice president of marine operations
at Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., calculated that "pre-employment testing of its seamen turned
up only 0.7-0.8 percent positive." Id. He complained: "If you take the entire dollar value of all
the tests, that amounts to $7,000 to $8,000 for each positive." Id. at D4.
39. Drug Testing Federal Employees, supra note 10, at 38 (statement of James Pierce,
President, The National Federation of Federal Employees).
40. Id. at 40.
41. Havemann, supra note 35, at A4.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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C. United States Supreme Court Challenges
The United States Supreme Court decisions in Skinner v. Rail-
road Labor Executive Association"' and National Treasury Union
v. Von Raab, 5 decided the same day, upheld programs that were
established by the Federal Railway Administration (hereinafter
FRA) and the U.S. Customs Service."' The unions argued that the
testing programs violated the Constitution's Fourth Amendment ban
on unreasonable search and seizure.4 7
The Court stated that individualized suspicion is not an indis-
pensable component of the reasonableness of a search where there
are "special needs."" Although the Court found drug testing to be a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the "special
needs" exception justified a departure from the usual warrant and
probable cause requirements. 9
In Skinner, the Court found "special needs" in the safety-sensi-
tive nature of the railroad employees' work,"0 and in the long history
of drug and alcohol-related problems in the industry."1 In Von Raab,
the government conceded that drug use was not a problem at all in
the Customs Service. 52 However, the Court found that the govern-
ment had a special need to ensure that "front-line interdiction per-
sonnel . . . have unimpeachable integrity and judgment,' 53 and that
those who carry firearms do not pose a hazard because of "impaired
perception and judgment."54 The Court also approved testing of per-
sonnel receiving access to "sensitive information" but remanded the
case to the lower court to determine which classified material was
"sensitive information."55 In both cases, the Court "assess[ed] the
practicality of the warrant and probable cause requirements in the
particular context" by balancing individual and governmental
interests.5
44. Skinner v. Railroad Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
45. National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
46. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679.
47. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 612; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663.
48. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
49. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618-19; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
50. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
51. Id. at 608.
52. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660.
53. Id. at 670.
54. Id. at 671.
55. Id. at 677-78.
56. Skinner v. Railroad Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619; Von Raab, 489
U.S. at 665.
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The Court justified its result by noting that drugs are "one of
the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our popula-
tion,"57 and that compelling governmental interests in ensuring the
safety and integrity of the workforce outweighed the minimal intru-
sion on an employee's privacy. 58
In a dissenting opinion in Skinner, Justice Marshall, with
whom Justice Brennan joined, acknowledged that the goal of safe
railways was a worthy end but also stated that the end must be
reached within constitutional boundaries.59 He decried the fact that
the majority bent "time-honored and textually-based principles of
the Fourth Amendment" 60 designed by the framers of the Bill of
Rights. Marshall wrote: "The Court today takes its longest step yet
toward reading the probable-cause requirement out of the Fourth
Amendment." 61 He accused the majority of succumbing to what Jus-
tice Holmes called the "hydraulic pressure"62 of popular opinion
which "appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment."63 Finally,
Justice Marshall warned that this decision would "reduce the pri-
vacy all citizens may enjoy, for ... principles of law, once bent, do
not snap back easily." '64
In a strong dissent in Von Raab, Justice Scalia condemned the
decision because there was no evidence of drug use, not "even a sin-
gle instance in which any of the speculated horribles actually oc-
curred."6 He stated that "the Custom Service rules are a kind of
immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to
57. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668 (1989).
58. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677.
59. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion in
Skinner, Justice Marshall warned of the dangers of succumbing to the drug hysteria:
Precisely because the need for action against the drug scourge is manifest, the
need for vigilance against unconstitutional excess is great. History teaches that
grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional
rights seem too extravagant to endure. The World War II relocation-camp cases
are ... reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in
the name of real or perceived exigency we invariably come to regret it.
Id.
60. Id. at 655.
61. Id. at 636.
62. Id. at 654 (citing Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
63. Id. at 654.
64. Id.
65. National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 683 (1989). "The only
pertinent points, it seems to me, are supported by nothing but speculation, and not very plausi-
ble speculation at that." Id. at 682.
[Vol. 33
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drug use" 66 and that the real purpose of the Custom Service rules
was to set an example that the government is serious about the drug
war.6 7 He felt that such symbolism was not sufficient to justify a
constitutionally defective search."8
Justice Scalia warned that in extending drug testing to those
who carry firearms "the Court exposes vast numbers of public em-
ployees to this needless indignity." '69 He stated that "if those who
carry guns can be treated in this fashion, so can all others whose
work, if performed under the influence of drugs, may endanger
others - automobile drivers, operators of other potentially dangerous
equipment, construction workers, [and] school crossing guards.17 0
He cautioned that the "sensitive information" exception could be
read broadly to extend to all federal employees with access to confi-
dential information.7 Justice Scalia also cautioned that the public
safety and sensitive information categories need not be limited to
public employees.72 He stated that under a "super-protection against
harms arising from drug use [rationale] .. .[,] a law requiring simi-
lar testing of private citizens who use dangerous instruments such as
guns or cars, or who have access to classified information, would also
be constitutional. '73 Quoting the memorable words of Justice Bran-
deis, he warned that it was "immaterial that the intrusion was in aid
of law enforcement .. . .The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding." 4
Although Joe Goldberg, staff counsel for the American Federa-
tion of Government Employees, stated that the "muddled logic" '76 of
these decisions "will be difficult ...to apply to other drug testing
situations,"76 other union commentators have disagreed.77 Alan C.
66. Id. at 681.
67. Id. at 686.
68. Id. at 687.
69. Id. at 685.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 685-86.
72. Id. at 686.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 687 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
75. Joe Goldberg, The Impact of NTEU v. Von Raab and Skinner v. RLEA: An Em-
ployee Perspective, 3 EMPLOYMENT TESTING 402, 403 (1989).
76. Id.
77. Alan C. Davis & Diane Ravnik, Drug Testing Developments, 8 CAL. LAB. & EM-
PLOYMENT. L. Q. 1, 3 (1990). "Therefore, even though these two cases supposedly limit drug-
testing to unusual 'special needs' situations, we can unfortunately anticipate a 'trickle-down'
effect with other types of employers." Id.
19931
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Davis and Diane Ravnik, labor lawyers for unions, stated:
The Supreme Court majority clearly feels that drug use is such
a significant menace that constitutionally-enshrined principles
must take a back seat .... [S]ince hypothetical speculation was
enough to overrule the constitutional rights of Customs Service
employees, one could imagine a worse-case [sic] legal scenario,
in which every possible hypothetical which could arguably jus-
tify drug-testing will be used to do so."'
Assistant Attorney General Richard Willard pointed to the fact that
the majority did not dispute Justice Scalia's broad analysis and pre.-
dicted that random testing would be approved "in jobs that are sensi-
tive because of safety or integrity requirements. '7 9 One commentator
wrote:
The majority could have made a more narrow ruling and up-
held drug testing. All [it] could have done was uphold drug test-
ing for those involved in drug enforcement. It chose instead to
write broadly. Many more millions of Americans may now be
subjected to drug testing as a condition of employment.80
D. First Lower Federal Court Decision After Skinner and Von
Raab Expands Rationale to Random Testing
Lower federal court decisions have justified Justice Scalia's
worst fears. Although Skinner and Von Raab did not deal with ran-
dom testing, court of appeals decisions have extended the "special
needs" analysis to random testing."' In the first court of appeals de-
78. Id.
79. Richard Willard, Supreme Court Gives 'Green Light' to Workplace Drug Testing, 3
EMPLOYMENT TSTING 400, 401 (1989).
80. ZEESE, supra note 7, § 5.01(3)(a).
81. See, e.g., Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1990) (random testing of
flight crews, air traffic controllers, aircraft maintenance personnel by Federal Aviation Admin-
istration held not to violate the Fourth Amendment); Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st
Cir. 1989) (random drug testing held permissible for police officers carrying weapons and/or
participating in drug interdiction programs); Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.
1989) (random drug tests of pipefitter and biochemist in chemical weapons plant did not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (air traffic controllers, criminal investigators, nurses, engineers, and electri-
cians could be subjected to random testing); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884
F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (random testing of police, guards, air traffic controllers, pilots,
aircraft mechanics, nuclear weapons technicians, and drug counselors did not violate the
Fourth Amendment); Brown v. City of Detroit, 715 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (court
lifted temporary restraining order prohibiting random testing of police officers); see also DRuG
TESTING CASE LAW DOCKET (Legal Action Center ed., 1990). This pamphlet can be ob-
tained from the Legal Action Center, 153 Waverly Place, New York, NY 10014.
[Vol. 33
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cision after Von Raab and Skinner, Harmon v. Thornburgh,82 the
influential panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia expanded court approval of drug testing further than the Su-
preme Court had.8" Although the court did not permit the Justice
Department to impose random tests on regular government lawyers,
it approved warrantless and suspicionless searches of those who have
access to top secret information.84 While recognizing that the random
testing of employees in Harmon was "somewhat more intrusive" 85
than the testing of applicants in Von Raab, Judge Wald concluded
that "[a] different result is not compelled." 86
The court identified three governmental interests which might
be sufficient to justify mandatory testing without individualized sus-
picion.87 These categories are: (1) maintenance of workforce "integ-
rity"; (2) enhancement of public safety; and (3) protection of "truly
sensitive information."88 Although Judge Wald approved the testing
of prosecutors of drug cases because they are "closely tied to enforce-
ment of federal drug laws,"89 she did not approve the Justice De-
partment's plan because a line was not drawn between drug prosecu-
tors and other prosecutors. 90 Judge Silberman, in dissent, stated that
the success of the anti-drug effort depended on "convincing all
Americans that drug use is as much a danger to them and to our
country as is an external enemy"'" and, in a Nazi analogy, com-
pared drug use among prosecutors to the display of Nazi symbols
during World War I.92
Paul J. Boudreaux, currently an attorney at the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, called Judge Wald's opinion "especially disturbing
to civil libertarians"9 in light of Justice Scalia's "thoughtful dis-
82. Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1056 (1990).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 492.
85. Id.
86. Id. Judge Wald also noted that there was a difference between a one-time test and
random testing, but did not feel that this difference was significant. Id. at 489.
87. Id. at 488.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 493.
90. Id. at 495.
91. Id. at 497.
92. Id.
93. Paul J. Boudreaux, The D.C. Circuit, The War on Drugs, and Harmon v. Thorn-
burgh: A Case Study in Misunderstanding Skinner and Von Raab, 12 GEo. MASON U. L.
REV. 701, 702 (1990). Boudreaux argues that Judge Wald's conclusions were "not at all com-
pelled by the decision in Von Raab." Id. at 703.
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sent"9 in Von Raab. He found Judge Silberman's dissent so as-
tounding in its use of Nazi analogies that "it seems almost silly to try
to argue against it with traditional legal tools."95 However he
warned: "[If] his declaration of war hysteria is heeded by other
courts, civil libertarians and average Americans alike may have to
barricade themselves in their cellars to avoid the resulting blitz
against [F]ourth [A]mendment rights." '96 Boudreaux saw this case as
an example of the way in which the war on drugs can lead both
"traditionally liberal and conservative judges to scuttle their legal
logic to reach conclusions expedient to the war effort.'
'9 7
However, one commentator saw the decision in Harmon v.
Thornburgh, as consistent with Supreme Court rulings.9" He stated:
"The Supreme Court rulings, while not specifically dealing with
random testing, were written in very broad language. No doubt
Judge Wald read the decisions as the Supreme Court meant them..
• . Indeed, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in the
case."
99
E. Lower Court Decisions Further Expand Random Testing
After Harmon v. Thornburgh, there was an avalanche of lower
court decisions which expanded random testing to many categories of
employees.1"' In Railway Labor Executives Association v. Skin-
ner, O' the court approved random drug testing of railroad workers.
The court supported its conclusion by citing the landslide of rulings
in the two years since Skinner and Von Raab in which various cir-
cuit courts have upheld random testing of jail employees,'0 2 local po-
lice who are armed or involved in drug interdiction,"' mass transit
workers,' federal employees with top national security clear-
ances, 0 5 and army employees working with chemical weapons.' 06
94. Id. at 702.
95. Id. at 708.
96. id.
97. Id. at 708-09.
98. ZEESE, supra note 7, § 5.01(3)(b).
99. Id.
100. See supra note 81.
101. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Skinner, 934 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1991).
102. Id. at 1099 (citing Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1989)).
103. Id. at 1100 (citing Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557, 1558 (1st Cir. 1989)).
104. Id. at 1099 (citing Transport Workers' Union v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.,
884 F.2d 709, 713 (3d Cir. 1989)).
105. Id. at 1100 (citing Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990)).
106. 934 F.2d at 1099 (citing Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113, 115 (4th Cir. 1989)).
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In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Department of
Transportation,"'0 the court upheld random testing of commercial
motor vehicle operators but decried, in dictum, the erosion of consti-
tutional rights:
Today we uphold a massive drug testing program that will
touch the lives of literally millions of citizens. We do not do so
lightly. We share many of the Unions' concerns about the sub-
stantial inroads drug testing makes on our precious [F]ourth
[Ajmendment freedoms. But we do not write upon a clean slate
in this area. Much of our decision is compelled by prior deci-
sions of the Supreme Court and this circuit. Unless and until
Congress or the Supreme Court reconsiders the enormous
constitutional cost, in terms of lost privacy, dignity, and auton-
omy, resulting from the "war on drugs," we are bound to apply
the law as it exists.108
F. Adequate and Independent State Grounds
As the Supreme Court has narrowed constitutional protections,
plaintiffs have been forced to litigate under state constitutions and to
rely on adequate and independent state grounds.10 9 Eleven states
have recognized a right to privacy in their respective constitutions." 0
For example, the California Constitution guarantees protection
against governmental and private invasions of privacy."' In Massa-
chusetts, a person has the statutory right to be free of unreasonable,
substantial, or serious interference with his privacy.1 2 The superior
court of that state has jurisdiction in equity to enforce such a right
107. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292 (9th
Cir. 1991).
108. Id. at 1309.
109. ZEESE, supra note 7, § 5.01(3)(c).
110. See supra note 6.
111. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § I provides: "All people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquir-
ing, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and
privacy." The seminal case defining the scope of this constitutional right to privacy is White v.
Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233-34 (Cal. 1975). See also Pipkin v. Board of Supervisors, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 502, 601 (1978) (stating that nonexistence or nonexpression of a fundamental right
under the federal Constitution does not preclude a finding of such a right under the California
Constitution); People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 283 (Cal. 1976) (reaffirming "the indepen-
dent nature of the California Constitution and [the court's responsibility to separately define
and protect the rights of California citizens despite conflicting decisions of the United States
Supreme Court interpreting the federal constitution")
112. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 214, § 1B (West 1989).
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and award damages, if necessary."'
In the drug testing context, plaintiffs have paid close attention
to the U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncement in Michigan v. Long" 4
that "[i]f the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that
it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and inde-
pendent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the de-
cision.""' 5 The Supreme Court of Vermont emphasized the impor-
tance of litigating under the state constitution, saying that failure to
present "substantial analysis or argument""' 6 under the state consti-
tution constitutes "inadequate briefing.""'  In Horsemen's Benevo-
lent Association v. State Racing Commission,"' the Supreme Judi-
cial Court for Suffolk held that testing jockeys was unconstitutional
based on the Massachusetts, not the Federal, constitution:
We need not consider this case in the context of the [F]ourth
[A]mendment, because we now conclude that the drug testing
program, in both the testing at random and "reasonable suspi-
cion," is unconstitutional under art. 14 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights. We cite and make reference to [F]ourth
[A]mendment cases only by way of analogy."1
In California, the courts of appeal have also relied on the state's
constitutional privacy right, but decisions reflect a conflict concerning
whether to apply the federal standard or stricter scrutiny than fed-
eral constitutional analysis would require.' Courts of appeal
113. Id.
114. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). In order to avoid the federal
court's review of a state court decision, the state court must "[miake clear by a plain statement
in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guid-
ance, and do not themselves compel the result." Id.
115. Id. at 1041.
116. State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 234 (Vt. 1985). Oregon Justice Hans Linde has
stated: " 'A lawyer today representing someone who claims some constitutional protection and
who does not argue that the state constitution provides that protection is skating on the edge of
malpractice.' " d. (quoting Welsh & Collins, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 14
CENTER MAG. 12 (Sept.-Oct. 1981)). In Jewett, Justice Hayes also emphasized "the resur-
gence of federalism that is sweeping across the country." Id. at 234. He wrote: "[S]ince 1970
there have been over 250 cases in which state appellate courts have viewed the scope of rights
under state constitutions as broader than those secured by the federal constitution as inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court." Id.
117. Jewett, 500 A.2d at 234.
118. Horsemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. State Racing Comm'n, 532 N.E.2d 644 (Mass.
1989)
119. Id. The court used the compelling need test and concluded that "art. 14 [of the
state constitution] prohibits random (without cause) drug testing by urinalysis of licensees
under the human drug regulation." Id. at 652.
120. Davis & Ravnik, supra note 77, at 4.
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adopted the stringent "compelling interest" test for determining vio-
lations of the state constitution's privacy right in Luck v. Southern
Pacific Railroad... and Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Associ-
ation.22 but adopted the lower threshold of justification used in Skin-
ner and Von Raab. in Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corporation,'2" a
case that involved applicant testing. However, in Soroka v. Dayton
Hudson Corporation,"4 a case that also involved applicant screening
tests, the court of appeal explicitly rejected the reasoning in Wilkin-
son and applied the "compelling interest" test. 2 5
In Luck, a computer programmer who had been employed by
the railroad for six years was instructed to submit a urine sample
and consent to testing." 6 She was terminated when she failed to
comply with the test. 2 " The Court of Appeal for the First District,
Division Four, acknowledged that drug testing would be governed by
the privacy interests protected by the California Constitution' and
endorsed a stricter scrutiny than federal constitutional analysis
would demand. 2' The court stated: "Southern Pacific urges us to
use the Fourth Amendment test. We see no reason to depart from
existing precedent applying the compelling interest test . . . .This
test places a heavier burden on Southern Pacific than would a
Fourth Amendment privacy analysis ..1.8.
In Wilkinson, the Court of Appeal for the First District, Divi-
sion Three, justified using the less stringent federal balancing test
121. Luck v. Southern Pac. R.R., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1990).
122. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Ct. App. 1990),
rev. granted Dec. 20, 1990 (No. 5018180).
123. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1989).
124. Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., I Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Ct. App. 1991).
125. Id.
126. Luck v. Southern Pac. R.R., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620 (Ct. App. 1990).
127. Id. at 621.
128. Id. at 625.
129. Id. at 629.
130. Id. The court found that the employer committed a contractual breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing by terminating Luck for her refusal to submit to the drug
test. Id. at 634. The court refused, however, to find that the termination constituted a violation
of public policy because it did not meet established criteria that the termination must affect a
duty that benefits the public. Id. at 635 (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. 765 P.2d 373
(Cal. 1988)). The right to privacy was held to be a private right, not a public right. Id.
However, in Semore v. Pool, the court held that an employee terminated for refusing to take a
random drug test may invoke the public policy exception to the at-will termination doctrine to
assert a violation of his constitutional right of privacy. Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 285
(Ct. App. 1990) ("We think, however, that there is a public policy concern in an individual's
right to privacy."). On May 31, 1990, the California Supreme Court denied review in both
cases, leaving the question of whether the right to privacy is a private right or a public right
unresolved.
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because, as an applicant and not as an employee, the plaintiff had a
diminished expectation of privacy. 81 In Soroka, however, the Court
of Appeal for the First District, Division Four, explicitly rejected the
distinction made in Wilkinson between the privacy rights of job ap-
plicants and employees.', 2 The court stated that "any violation of the
right to privacy of job applicants must be justified by a compelling
interest."183 The court reasoned that this conclusion was consistent
with the voters' intent in amending the California Constitution to
make privacy an inalienable right.'
In Hill, the Court of Appeal for the Sixth District also elected
to use the "compelling interest" test in the context of National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (hereinafter NCAA) drug testing rules
which require urinalysis testing of athletes in post-season champion-
ship competition."3 5 The NCAA contended that drug testing was
necessary to protect the health and safety of student athletes.' 6 The
court rejected this argument because the program was not effective in
reaching its stated goals of protecting student health and safety.' 87
The court also held that the NCAA did not meet another component
of the "compelling need" test, whether there was a less intrusive
means of furthering the NCAA's stated goals.' 8 Since the NCAA
had not attempted drug education as a deterrent to drug use or test-
ing based on reasonable suspicion, there was no way to know if less
intrusive means would have been effective in achieving the goal of
the NCAA.' 39
The confusion over which test to use was reflected in an opinion
by the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (herein-
after UIAB) which denied benefits to a housekeeper employed on an
offshore oil rig, who was fired for refusing to take a urinalysis
test."  The majority applied the test used by the Wilkinson court, "
131. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 204 (Ct. App. 1989).
132. Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., I Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 83 (Ct. App. 1991).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Ct. App. 1990),
rev. granted Dec. 20, 1990 (No. 5018180). The court stated that claims under art. 1, § 1
required "the state to show a compelling interest before it can invade a fundamental privacy
right .. . .The weight of governmental interest that must be shown is not simply that the
regulation has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose ......
Id. at 410. The California Supreme Court granted review in Hill on Dec. 20, 1990.
136. Id. at 417.
137. Id. at 418.
138. Id. at 421.
139. Id. at 422.
140. Hayes v. SHRM Catering Servs., UIAB Dec. No. P-B-470.
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and the dissent contended that the proper test was the more stringent
Luck "compelling interest" test.1 2 The employee filed suit in supe-
rior court in January, 1991.43
G. State and Local Legislation
Drug testing legislation has increased dramatically at the state
level in recent years. 4 In 1986, only seven states considered drug
testing legislation, and no statutes were enacted. 4 By the end of
1989, twelve states regulated drug testing. 4 By 1990, eighteen
states '4  and a number of cities 48  had enacted drug testing
legislation.
Most state laws and local ordinances are designed to address the
problems of invasion of privacy, confidentiality of results, and unreli-
able testing facilities. 49 The exception is Utah, the first state to pass
drug testing legislation 5" and the state which provides the least em-
ployee safeguards.1 ' One commentator has called the Utah legisla-
tion a law "to facilitate drug testing.' 5 2
1. Utah
The Utah legislation allows the employer to randomly test em-
ployees for the presence of drugs or alcohol.' The employer who
takes disciplinary steps in compliance with the Utah drug testing
statute is immune from civil liability if his actions are based on a
valid test result. 54 All test results are presumed valid if they comply
141. Id. at 8.
142. Id. at 6 (Walker, L., dissenting).
143. AFL-CIO v. UIAB, No. 114425 (filed Jan. 3, 1991). Telephone Interview with
Michael Rubin, partner of Altshuler & Berzon, attorney for the plaintiff (Dec. 9, 1991).
144. ZEESE, supra note 7, § 1.05(3).
145. See Thomas McGovern, Employee Drug-Testing Legislation: Redrawing the Bat-
tlelines in the War on Drugs, 39 STAN. L. REV., 1453, 1470 (1987) (listing California,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Oregon as the states that had
considered drug testing legislation).
146. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51t-51aa (1988); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 730.5 (1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.950-957 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304
(1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-65-1 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-1-15 (1987); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 511-520 (1987).
147. See supra note 8.
148. See supra note 9.
149. ZEESE, supra note 7, § 1.05(3).
150. See Note, Drug and Alcohol Testing, 149 UTAH L. REV. 284 (1988).
151. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-1-15 (1987).
152. ZEESE, supra note 7, § 1.05(3).
153. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-7 (West 1987).
154. Id. § 34-38-10.
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with the collection and testing requirements of the Utah drug testing
statute.
155
A commentator complained that the testing standards in the
Utah statute are defined in broad and vague terms and "participat-
ing labs are not required to meet any standards of professional com-
petence or to be certified or monitored in any way.' 1 56 In addition,
this commentator stated that a further shortcoming of the Utah stat-
ute is that it does not specifically define a "positive" test result. 57
There are also no standards for "sanitary" conditions or chain of
custody safeguards.' 58
2. Berkeley, California
The most restrictive legislation comes from Berkeley, Califor-
nia.' 59 As part of the "Labor Bill of Rights," the Berkeley City
Council adopted a resolution on October 25, 1988 that prohibits
drug testing within the city limits because "mandatory testing pre-
supposes an employee's guilt until proven innocent, and violates an
employee's constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy."' 60
3. San Francisco, California
The first local drug testing ordinance ever passed,' 6 ' the San
Francisco ordinance, took effect on Dec. 29, 1985.16 The purpose of
the ordinance was to permit "all citizens to enjoy the full benefit of
the right of privacy in the workplace guaranteed to them by ... the
California Constitution ... [and] to protect employees against unrea-
sonable inquiry and investigation into off-the-job conduct ...not
directly related to the ... job."' 63 The ordinance prohibits employers
from testing unless the employer has reasonable grounds to believe
155. Id. § 34-38-10.
156. Supra note 150, at 289.
157. Supra note 150, at 289-90.
158. Supra note 150, at 289-90.
159. Berkeley, Cal., Resolution No. 54,533 (Oct. 25, 1988).
160. Id. at 3.
161. See Cliff Palefsky, Corporate Vice Precedents: The California Constitution and
San Francisco Worker Privacy Ordinance, 11 NOVA L. REV. 669, 674 (1987).
162. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE pt. II, ch. VIII, art. 33A (1985). The
sponsor of the legislation, Supervisor Bill Maher, cited escalating "incidents of invasion of
privacy and firings in the private workforce" as the motivation for the legislation. Bill Maher,
Maher Introduces Ordinances To Protect Workers' Privacy, Press Release of Board of Super-
visors, City and County of San Francisco (Sept. 30, 1985), cited in Cliff Palefsky Corporate
Vice Precedents: The California Constitution and San Francisco's Worker Privacy Ordi-
nance, 11 NOVA L. REV. 669, 674 (1987).
163. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE pt. II, ch. VIII, §3300 A.1 (1985).
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that the employee is impaired, the impairment presents a clear and
present danger, and the employee has the opportunity to explain the
results and to have the sample evaluated by an independent lab."'
4. The Iowa, Vermont, Rhode Island, and Montana Drug
Testing Statutes
President Bush has expressed his concern about drug testing
laws passed in Iowa, Rhode Island, Montana, and Vermont. 165
These state statutes expressly prohibit all random drug testing.' In
a speech announcing his updated drug control strategy, President
Bush criticized the states by saying:
[A] number of states have enacted legislation limiting or restrict-
ing drug testing. Not only can such legislation be counter-
productive to the goal of a drug-free workplace, but because
these laws are rarely consistent, the task of developing compre-
hensive employee assistance programs is made more difficult for
large corporations whose operations cross state lines. 67
The drug testing statutes that President Bush objected to in his
speech have many common features. Iowa, Montana, Rhode Island,
and Vermont allow drug testing only upon a showing of probable
cause.16 Rhode Island and Vermont permit probable cause testing
only when the employer has a bona fide rehabilitation program
available."' In Iowa and Vermont, an employee may not be termi-
nated if the test result is positive and the employee agrees to partici-
pate in, and then successfully completes, an employee assistance pro-
gram. 70 If the employee has a positive test subsequent to completing
a rehabilitation program, then he or she may be terminated."7' The
Iowa and Vermont statutes contain provisions which require the em-
ployer to use only a laboratory designated by the Department of
Health.17 2 Vermont establishes a chain of custody procedure.' 8
164. Id.
165. See supra note 11.
166. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5 (3)(a) (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(c)
(1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5(A) (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 513(b) (1987).
167. See supra note 11.
168. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5 (3)(a) (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(c)
(1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5(A) (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 513(b) (1987).
169. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5(c) (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 513(c)(1)(2)
(1989).
170. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5(f) (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 513(c)(3) (1987).
171. IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.5(Q (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 513 (c)(3) (1987).
172. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5(3)(c) (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 514 (4) (1987).
173. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 514 (5) (1987). The chain of custody commences with
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Rhode Island and Vermont require a confirmatory test by gas chro-
matography with mass spectrometry (hereinafter GC/MS) or an
equivalent scientifically accepted method;"7 4 Iowa requires verifica-
tion by two or more testing procedures.' All four states provide the
employee or applicant with an opportunity to retest the sample and
explain the results.'17  Rhode Island requires that the test sample be
provided under conditions that maximize privacy. 1' In Iowa, the
employer must ensure that the tests only measure, and the records
only reflect, information regarding chemical substances likely to af-
fect the ability of the employee to perform safely.178 In all three
states, violation of the statute by an employer is a misdemeanor.' 7 9
In addition, there are civil penalties for violation of the statute in
Vermont, Rhode Island, and Iowa.'80 Rhode Island permits awards
of punitive damages;'' Vermont and Iowa award attorney's fees and
court costs in addition to damages.18 2
urine collection and continues until test results are reported to the client. At each step the
chain of custody procedures require documentation that proper standards have been met and
that the security of the sample has not been breached. Any breach in the chain of custody
raises serious questions about the validity of the test results. ZEESE, supra note 7, § 2.01(20).
174. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 514(6)(A) (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS 28-6.5-1(D) (1987).
Leading forensic toxicologists stress that a urine sample which is positive by an immunoassay
method must be tested by an alternative method such as GC/MS to obtain accurate results.
Arthur J. McBay, et al., Urine Testing for Marijuana Use, 249 JAMA 881 (1983) ("[D]rug
identification . . . must be confirmed by adequate alternative chemical analyses . ... Gas
Chromatography-mass spectrometry assays . . . are available and proved accurate and suffi-
ciently sensitive."). In a January 27, 1987 letter to manufacturers of devices for drugs of abuse
screening tests, the Food and Drug Administration included the following statement: "All posi-
tive tests should be confirmed by an independent and more specific method. Gas chromatogra-
phy/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) is the confirmatory method of choice." Kurt Dubowski,
Drug Testing Scientific Perspectives, citing Letter of K. Mohan, Office of Device Evaluation,
Food and Drug Administration (Jan. 27, 1987), 11 NOVA L. REv. 415, 484 (1987). Although
GC/MS screening is very accurate, it does not, however, "eliminate the possibility of false
positives due to inaccurate adjustment of the mass spectrometer, contaminated instruments,
temperature changes, insufficient skill or training of the laboratory technicians, or problems
with the validity or chain of custody of the sample." Horsemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. State
Racing Comm'n, 532 N.E.2d 644, 647 (Mass. 1989).
175. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5 (3)(d) (West 1989).
176. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5(3)(3) (West 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(3)
(1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-1(0 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 515(b) (1987).
177. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-1(B) (1987).
178. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5(4) (West 1989).
179. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5(11) (West 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(5)
(1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-1(F); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 519(d) (1987).
180. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5(9) (West 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 29-6.51(F) (1987);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 519(a) (1987).
181. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 29-6.5(0(1) (1987).
182. IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5(9)(a) (West 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 2i § 519(a)
(1987).
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H. The Federal Response to State Legislation
1. The Model State Legislation of the Office of National Drug
Control Strategy
In order to encourage states to adopt statutes that reflect the
administration's policy on drug testing, the Office of National Drug
Control Strategy has proposed four separate model state bills. 83 The
first is a Workforce Drug Testing Act that is designed "to aid pri-
vate sector employers who wish to adopt drug testing plans, by pro-
tecting these employers from litigation if their plans meet the stan-
dards in the plan."' 84 The second is a Workforce Drug Use
Prevention Act which requires corporations which receive contracts
or grants from the state government to institute an anti-drug plan. 8
The third is an Anti-Drug Use State Licensing Act which requires
all state-licensed professionals who are convicted of a drug-related
crime to participate in a drug treatment program or face the prospect
of having their professional licenses suspended. 8 The final bill is a
State Employee Drug-Free Workforce Act which subjects employees
holding sensitive positions in state government to drug testing.'
2. The Model Workforce Drug Testing Act
Like the Utah statute, the model Workforce Drug Testing Act
prohibits any cause of action against the employer unless the em-
ployer's reliance on a test result was unreasonable or in bad faith.'
However, the model legislation provides that an employer's compli-
ance with the model bill creates a rebuttable presumption that his
reliance was reasonable. 88 The model Workforce Drug Testing Act
also prohibits any cause of action for defamation, libel, slander, or
damage to reputation unless the employer knowingly disclosed erro-
neous test results with malice.' 90
The model Workforce Drug Testing Act requires a written
plan with a description of legal sanctions,'' standards of conduct,"'
183. William J. Bennett, Preface to BUILDING A DRUG-FREE WORKFORCE (Office Of
National Drug Control Policy, 1990).
184. BUILDING A DRUG-FREE WORKFORCE (Office of National Drug Control Policy,
1990) TAB A, 7.
185. Id. at TAB B, 1.
186. Id. at TAB C, 1.
187. Id. at TAB D, 1.
188. Id. § 3(A)(1), TAB A, 2.
189. Id.
190. Id. § 3(A)(2), TAB A, 2.
191. Id. § 4(A)(1), TAB A, 3.
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a drug counseling or rehabilitation program, 93 sanctions imposed by
the employer,194 and a list of the drugs tested. 5 The model bill also
contains provisions for confidentiality except in proceedings taken by
the employer or in workplace accidents where it is probable that
drugs played a role.1 96
The model Workforce Drug Testing Act addresses privacy con-
cerns and problems related to testing accuracy and standards.1 97
However, the protections are limited. Although the bill provides for
private sample collection, privacy is not required where the employer
may believe the employee may alter or substitute the sample.' 98
Chain of custody procedures are to be followed and verification by
GC/MS'99 or a comparable method is to be used.200 However, rigor-
ous NIDA standards are not required for sample testing.2' Instead,
the model bill specifically authorizes testing in a lab certified by
NIDA or by a body designated by the State Department of
Health.2 °2
3. The Model State Employee Drug-Free Workplace Act
The State Employee Drug-Free Workplace Plan explicitly pro-
vides for random testing of employees in sensitive positions.20 ' The
extent to which such employees are tested and the criteria for such
testing are to be determined by the heads of each executive branch
agency.204 In the commentary, the authors of the legislation warn
that random testing is only to be performed where it is consistent
with current legal decisions.205 The authors, however, advise legisla-
tors to specifically authorize random drug testing.206 The commen-
tary also warns that "reasonable suspicion and post-accident testing
are areas of considerable litigation."2 Legislators are advised to re-
192. Id. § 4(A)(3), TAB A, 3.
193. Id. § 4(A)(4), TAB A, 3.
194. Id. § 4(A)(5), TAB A, 3.
195. Id. § 4(A)(7), TAB A, 4.
196. Id. § 4(A)(10), TAB A, 4.
197. Id. § 4(C), TAB A, 4.
198. Id.
199. Id. § 4(D), TAB A, 5.
200. Id. § 4(E), TAB A, 5.
201. Id. § 4(E), TAB A, 5.
202. Id. § 4(E), TAB A, 5.
203. Id. § 6(A), TAB D, 5.
204. Id.
205. Id. § 6(A), TAB D, 13.
206. Id.
207. Id. § 6(B), TAB D, 13.
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view court cases to get a sense of court opinion in this area.208
Although no specific supervisorial training is required to detect
employee drug use, an agency may determine that an employee uses
illegal drugs by the use of any appropriate evidence including direct
observation, a criminal conviction, or the results of an authorized
testing program.2"9
Like the Workforce Drug Testing Act, the State Employee
Drug Free Workplace Plan does not define a "positive" result, set
cut-off levels, or require state-of-the-art regulation of testing. 210
However, unlike the private sector bill, the state bill permits random
testing of employees in "sensitive" positions. 11 The term "employee
in a sensitive position" is defined as follows:
(1) Appointees serving at the pleasure of the Governor or whose
appointment required confirmation by the State Legislature;
(2) All elected officials;
(3) Law enforcement officers...
(4) Other positions that the Governor or agency head deter-
mines involve law enforcement, the protection of life and prop-
erty, public health or safety, or other functions requiring a high
degree of trust and confidence. 12
4. State Drug Control Status Report: An Office of National
Drug Control Policy White Paper
In November, 1990, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
produced a State Drug Control Status Report which analyzed sev-
208. Id.
209. Id. § 8(F), TAB D, 8.
210. The commentary to § 7(C) of the State Employee Drug Free Workplace Act states
that "[dIrug testing programs must contain certain procedures, but this statute deliberately
refrains from spelling these out in detail to allow for diversity among the States in how they
will carry out their drug testing programs." Id. § 7(C), TAB D, 13. States are, therefore, not
required to maintain rigorous standards to ensure validity of the tests. Apparently the Office of
National Drug Control Policy has taken the position that diversity among the states is more
important than prescribing strict guidelines that must be followed. This philosophy is also
reflected in § 7(D) which addresses the problem of regulation of drug testing labs. States are
left free to decide whether to "key their program to rigorous NIDA standards which are
highly regarded for their scientific and technical merit, or . . . to use some other means of
monitoring scientific and technical aspects." Id. § 7(D), TAB D, 13. States are, therefore, free
to regulate themselves. The Office of National Drug Control Policy does not see the urgency of
mandating state-of-the-art requirements for certifying drug testing labs. H.R. 33, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 557(a) (1991). See infra text accompanying note 248 for a discussion of the need
for instituting rigorous controls over what are largely unregulated state drug testing labs.
211. BUILDING A DRUG-FREE WORKFORCE (Office of National Drug Control Policy,
1990) TAB D, 5.
212. Id. § 3(B), TAB D, 2.
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eral state drug control indicators.21 In its discussion of drug control
policies, the status report praised private sector drug testing pro-
grams which have instituted random testing at all levels. 14 The sta-
tus report focused on two programs of private companies that it
called "commendable. 2 Both "subject all employees to random
testing, including upper level managers." 1 6 One of the programs is
that of Texas Instruments; the company's program includes plans to
randomly test all of its 52,000 United States employees by the end of
1993.217 The status report also praised Motorola, Inc. because it has
plans to institute a similar program.2 8 Like the model state legisla-
tion, the status report urged states to issue guidelines to ensure that
testing procedures recognize generally acceptable laboratory stan-
dards in order to "remove the threat of costly employee litigation
which deters many companies from implementing even a limited
testing program. "210
In its discussion of drug testing for public sector employees, the
status report suggested that public officials who serve as role models
in the fight against drugs and other state employees who hold safety-
sensitive positions "should be held to an even higher standard. 220
However, it warned that many courts have limited the extent to
which public employees can be tested.2 State legislatures were,
therefore, urged to "ensure that the State executive branch is en-
couraged, empowered, and, if necessary, required to employ drug
testing within the State workplace. ' 222 States were also urged to act
promptly to ensure the passage of legislation necessary to implement
drug testing.223 However, both the model state legislation and the
status report have failed to have much of an impact on the states in
the area of random testing.2 The status report conceded that
"[o]nly a handful of States have passed legislation that would explic-
itly allow companies to implement random testing of all employees
213. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, STATE DRUG CONTROL STATUS
REPORT (1990).
214. Id. at 17.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 18.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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[and a] few States have prohibited such testing. '225
I. Proposed Federal Legislation
1. Senate Bill 2695 - The Hatch Bill
Senate Bill 2695 was a more direct attack on states that prohibit
random drug testing. 26 On May 24, 1989, Senator Hatch intro-
duced this bill "to eliminate the scourge of illegal drugs and fight
drug abuse. '22 7 The bill explicitly preempted "state and local laws
and such other requirements that frustrate, conflict with, interfere
with, or are inconsistent with the standards established by this
Act."22 The bill would have permitted random testing of employees
in "sensitive" positions. 29 "Sensitive" was defined in the same broad
terms as it was in the model state legislation produced by the Office
of National Drug Control Strategy. s A "sensitive" position was one
"whose duties, as defined by the employer, involve responsibilities
affecting such matters as national security, health, or safety, environ-
ment, or other responsibilities requiring a high degree of trust and
confidence." 23 1
225. Id.
226. S. 2695, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
227. Id.
228. Id. § 2611. Sociologists, political scientists, and members of the judiciary have ar-
gued that states are more effective laboratories for social legislation than the federal govern-
ment. See generally New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (states should serve as laboratories for social and economic experimentation);
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956),
quoted in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 136 (1991) (citizens can
move to the states that match their policy preferences); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sover-
eignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341,
quoted in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 138 (1991) (states offer pro-
tection against federal governmental oppression); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Pol-
icy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210-11 (1977), quoted in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 5-21, at 385 (2d ed. 1988) (decentralized structure protects individual
rights); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (with the erosion of fundamental rights at the federal level,
state courts offer protections of individual rights); John S. McClenahen, The Privacy Invasion,
INDUS. WK. 50, 53 (Nov. 1, 1985) (local Chambers of Commerce can have an impact on
decision making at the state level); ADVISORY COMMISSION INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS, THE QUESTION OF STATE GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY 23 (1985), quoted in GEOF-
FREY R. STONE ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 136 (1991) (listing innovations begun at the
state level).
229. S. 2695, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2604(5) (1990).
230. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, STATE DRUG CONTROL STATUS
REPORT, § 3(B), TAB D, 2 (1990).
231. S. 2695, 101st Cong., 2d sess. § 2614(g) (1990).
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The bill also required certification for all laboratories perform-
ing drug tests.23 2 However, it did not state a particular standard,233
and its requirements were even weaker than those of the model state
legislation. The rigorous NIDA standards were not even mentioned
as an option. Instead the Secretary of Health and Human Services
was urged to "take into consideration the practices, procedures, and
experiences of the basic drug testing programs conducted by private,
non-profit accrediting bodies."
23 4
Senate Bill 2695 placed severe limitations on the legal remedies
available to employees disciplined or terminated under the provisions
of the bill.235 It established a statutory scheme whereby complaints
were to be filed with the Secretary of Health and Human Services
who would conduct an investigation of the violation. 28' The bill per-
mitted such suitable remedies as the Secretary would deem appropri-
ate, but remedies were limited to contract remedies such as reinstate-
ment, promotion, and the payment of lost wages and benefits.237 An
employer or employee could obtain review of the Secretary's deci-
sions in the federal appeals court in the circuit in which the violation
occurred.2"8 If an employer or employee failed to comply with an
order, a civil action could be filed in federal district court to enforce
the order.23 9 This statutory scheme with appellate court review was
the exclusive remedy for violation of the bill.240 Senate Bill 2695 was
referred to the Judiciary Committee during the 101st Congress and
died there.241
2. House Bill 33
A 1988 General Accounting Office (hereinafter GAO) survey
showed that "there is no uniform nationwide regulation of all labo-
ratories that can do employee drug testing." '242 According to the
232. Id. § 2601(b).
233. Id. § 2601(c).
234. Id.
235. Id. § 2610(b)(1).
236. Id. § 2610(b)(1).
237. Id. § 2610(2)(B)(3).
238. Id. § 2610(2)(B)(4).
239. Id. § 2610(5).
240. Id. § 2610(5)(C).
241. Telephone Interview with John Werts, Intern to Senator John Seymour (R-Cal.)
(Jan. 23, 1992).
242. Fact Sheet for the Honorable Charles E. Schumer, House of Representatives,
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE DRUG TESTING: REGULATION OF DRUG TEST-
ING LABS, PUB. No. B-223280, 1, 1-2, (1988).
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study, employee drug testing laboratories are not controlled by stat-
ute or regulation in twenty-four states.'" 3 Only eleven states have
specific employee drug testing laboratory statutes, and fifteen states
have statutes and regulations that control general or clinical labora-
tories.2,1 Seven of the eleven states with specific employee drug test-
ing laboratory regulations require the most accurate GC/MS confir-
matory tests, and eight of the eleven require that chain of custody
procedures be followed.24 5 Only one of the fifteen states with general
regulations requires a confirmatory test, and none of these states
have chain of custody requirements to control specimens. 2,1 In 1989
hearings before a House Subcommittee, Dr. Richard Hawks of
NIDA testified that he "wouldn't want to see [his] urine at the far
majority of those [drug testing labs] . . . knowing what we know
about the need to be very stringent. 2, 7
On January 3, 1991, Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.) and Rep.
Thomas Bliley, Jr. (R-Va.) introduced House Bill 33, a bill that
would provide uniform regulation of drug testing laboratories."4 8
The purpose of the bill was "to establish standards for the certifica-
tion of laboratories engaged in urine drug testing.""4 9 The bill
adopts the mandatory guidelines for federal workplace drug testing
programs.2"' These standards are more precise and more rigorous
than the industry's standards adopted in Senate Bill 2695. The rem-
edies provided are also broader than those of Senate Bill 2695.
House Bill 33 authorizes criminal sanctions ,251 administrative reme-
243. Id. at 2.
244. Id. at 3.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Proficiency Standards for Drug Testing Laboratories: Hearings Before a Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 219 (1987)
(statement by Dr. Richard Hawks of the National Institute of Drug Abuse).
248. H.R. 33, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). House Bill 33 was introduced on January
3, 1991, and referred to the Energy and Commerce Committee of the House of Representa-
tives. On February 11, it was sent to the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, and, on
July 29, it went to the full committee. On Sept. 25, H.R. 33 was sent to the House and
ordered to be reported. The bill was reported and placed on the calendar on November 12,
1991. Telephone Interview with Dave Allen, Staff Aide to Representative Thomas Campbell
(R-Stanford) (Jan. 23, 1992).
249. H.R. 33, 102 Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1991). This bill explicitly authorizes the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services to establish appropriate cutoff levels for each drug or class
of drugs for both initial and confirmatory tests, id. § 552(b)(5), provides for blind performance
testing, id. § 552(b)(6)(B), and allows no interim certification procedures. Id. § 552(b)(7).
250. Id. at 2. NIDA regulates federal drug testing programs. NIDA restricts the num-
ber of labs which can provide test results, and its standards are considered to be the current
state-of-the-art. See supra note 188, § 7, TAB D, 13.
251. H.R. 33, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 555(a) (1991).
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dies,252 and civil action for violation of the statute.253 House Bill 33
would preempt any state or local government legislation relating to
"(1) the certification of laboratories which perform drug testing, or
(2) requirements for the conduct of drug testing under the certifica-
tion program established under this part which is different from such
certification program."' 54 Because this bill addresses only the prob-
lem of lack of regulation of drug testing labs and limits preemption
only to certification of laboratories and requirements for the conduct
of drug testing, state legislation protecting privacy rights and confi-
dentiality of testing remains untouched.
J. Implied Preemption and State Legislation
1. French v. Pan Am Express
Even without the express preemption of legislation such as Sen-
ate Bill 2695 or House Bill 33, courts have found that federal regu-
lations impliedly preempt state drug testing laws.2"5 Absent express
language, preemption may be implied where Congress occupies a
given field with a scheme of federal regulation "so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it."' 56 Even where Congress has not entirely
superseded state regulation in a specific area, state law is still pre-
empted "to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law."2 "
Preemption may also be implied if state law "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress. '2 58 The question of whether federal law preempts a
state statute is one of congressional intent.25 9 The Supreme Court,
however, is "reluctant to infer preemption from the comprehensive-
ness of regulations."26 There is a presumption that state laws re-
lated to health or safety matters are not preempted.26 1
252. Id. § 555(b).
253. Id. § 555(c).
254. Id. § 557(a).
255. See, e.g., French v. Pan Am Express, 869 F.2d 1, 6 (lst Cir. 1989).
256. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The power of Con-
gress to preempt state law derives from the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitu-
tion. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986). Preemption may be
express or implied. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983).
257. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, (1983).
258. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941).
259. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987).
260. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985).
261. Id. at 715.
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Despite this presumption, the court of appeals in French v.
Pan Am Express262 found that the Federal Aviation Act impliedly
preempts the Rhode Island drug testing statute that prohibits ran-
dom testing.263 In French, a pilot claimed that he was ordered to
submit to a drug test without probable cause in violation of a Rhode
Island statute." Despite the fact that the court characterized im-
plied preemption as a "subtle creature . . . [with] a certain protean
quality, which renders pigeonholing difficult," 6 ' it had no difficulty
in finding that Congress intended to occupy the field of pilot regula-
tion related to air safety.266 At the time the pilot filed suit, there was
no federal drug testing program in effect. 6 ' However, the court
found that the federal regulation prohibiting individuals using drugs
from serving as crewmembers on civil aircraft impinged directly on
the Rhode Island state drug testing statute.268 The court appeared to
echo President Bush's concerns about the effect of inconsistent state
drug testing legislation on large corporations. 269 The court stated:
Moreover, a patchwork of state laws .. .some in conflict with
each other, would create a crazyquilt effect. It is simply unrea-
sonable to hypothesize that Congress intended a commercial pi-
lot on a Providence-to-Baltimore-to-Miami run to be subject to
drug testing, say, in Maryland, but not in Rhode Island or in
Florida.7
The court also inferred preemption from the goals of the federal
statute.71 Relying on legislative history, the court found that the pri-
mary objective of the Act was the establishment of a single uniform
system of regulation in the area of air safety.27 2 The court rejected
the argument that there was no implied preemption because the
objectives of the Federal Aviation Act and Rhode Island Gen. Laws
262. French v. Pan Am Express, 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-
1(A) (1987).
263. French, 869 F.2d at 7.
264. Id. at 1.
265. Id. at 2.
266. Id. at 6. The court rejected the argument that Congress intended to limit preemp-
tion to "rates, routes, or services" of the carrier since the statute specifically prohibited states
from enacting or enforcing laws related to "rates, routes, or services." Id. at 3. The court
stated that the naming of specific areas is no basis for concluding that Congress intended to
permit states to regulate in other areas related to airline safety, such as drug testing. Id.
267. Id. at 5.
268. Id. at 4.
269. See supra note 11.
270. French, 869 F.2d at 6.
271. Id. at 5.
272. Id.
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section 28-6.5-1 were "not adverse"2 ' and that the "requirement of
reasonableness at the inception of a drug test ... is echoed by the..
. Act's own safety rules."'27 4 While not disputing that the objectives
were complementary, the court stated that once Congress has occu-
pied the field, state law must yield "notwithstanding that it may fit
neatly within or alongside the federal scheme."'2 7
2. Associated Industries of Massachusetts v. Snow
In Associated Industries of Massachusetts v. Snow,27 1 however,
the court held that there was no implied preemption of state work-
place safety statutes where rules were not adverse and where it was
not physically impossible to comply with both the federal Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (hereinafter OSHA) regu-
lations and state law.277 The court emphasized that a state's police
powers are not displaced by federal law absent "compelling evidence
that this was the manifest purpose of Congress. '2 78 The court stated:
The burden of overcoming the presumption, in favor of state
law is heavy in those cases that rely on implied preemption
which rests in turn on inference. Inference and implication will
only rarely lead to the conclusion that it was the "clear and
manifest purpose" of the federal government to supersede the
states' historic power to regulate health and safety.27 9
The court reasoned that a provision that increased the regula-
tory burden on employers was not contrary to congressional intent
and that, in protecting the public, the Massachusetts statute was
strengthening, rather than threatening, the protection afforded work-
ers by Congress.2"' The court rejected arguments that the Massachu-
setts law blocked congressional objectives by upsetting the balance of
safety, health, technological, and economic concerns struck by Con-
gress.28 The critical question for the court was not whether a con-
273. Id. at 6.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Associated Indus. of Mass. v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1990).
277. Id. at 283.
278. Id. at 282.
279. Id. (quoting Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. New York City, 855 F.2d 48,
58 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted)).
280. Id. at 283.
281. Id. at 282. The court distinguished the case from Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987) and Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837 (1st
Cir. 1988). In Palmer, the court found that Congress' purpose in enacting the Federal Ciga-
rette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340, was to balance the competing
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gressional balancing was altered by state law but, if altered, whether
the change obstructed the purpose of Congress.28 2 Since the effect of
Massachusetts health and safety regulations was to protect the pub-
lic, the court found that the state statute did not obstruct congres-
sional objectives.2"'
III. ANALYSIS
A. Senate Bill 2695
It is important to analyze whether such bills as Senate Bill
2695, that explicitly preempt state legislation in the drug testing
area, will adequately balance the needs of employees and employers.
Senate Bill 2695 failed to achieve this balance in many critical areas.
In the important area of regulation of laboratories, the bill would not
have implemented the rigorous NIDA standards but would have re-
lied instead on the "practices, procedures, and experiences" of pri-
vate laboratories.2"4 According to one commentator, "[t]he industry
seems to be encouraged to loosely regulate itself. Indeed, under this
scheme, volunteer inspectors from one private laboratory would test
another lab, and vice versa."285
The reluctance to adopt the NIDA standards may reflect the
reasoning of industry groups such as the California Chamber of
Commerce, the most vocal opponent of a proposed California drug
testing statute, California Assembly Bill 4242.28 The Chamber of
Commerce opposed the Assembly bill because it feared that restric-
policies of health protection and protection of the national economy. The court held that a suit
for negligent failure to warn about the harmful effects of smoking would obstruct Congress's
purpose. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626. In Hyde Park, the court held that a Massachusetts disclo-
sure rule related to take-over bids altered a balance set by the federal Williams Act, 82 Stat.
454, amended by 15 U.S.C. § 78 (m)(d) - (e) and § 78 (n)(d) - (f), between managers and
offerors. However, the fact that the state rule altered the balance was not the critical factor for
the court. The question was whether the rule altered the balance in a way that subverted the
purposes of the federal statute. The court held that the shift would work against the sharehold-
ers and obstruct the purpose of the Act. Hyde Park, 839 F.2d at 853. In contrast, the Massa-
chusetts workplace standards in Associated Industries strengthened rather than threatened the
protections offered by OSHA, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-678), standard and shifted the balance between employer and employee in a way that
did not obstruct the purpose of the statute. Hyde Park, 839 F.2d at 853.
282. Associated Indus., 898 F.2d at 283.
283. Id. at 284.
284. S. 2695, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2111(d) (1990).
285. ZEESE, supra note 7, § 1.05(1).
286. McGovern, supra note 145, at 1474. The bill was vetoed, apparently because Gov-
ernor Deukmejian opposed the bill's provision that required employers to use a state-licensed
laboratory. Id. at 1472 n.93. Governor Deukmejian was concerned that the bill would not
permit law enforcement laboratories to conduct tests or employers to use field test kits. Id.
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tions on the use of inexpensive testing kits would freeze employer
options by preventing them from using the kits even if they later
become acceptably reliable.28 7 Such reasoning is obviously flawed.
The Chamber of Commerce was asking the state to forego state-of-
the-art laboratory standards for inferior ones because of the possibil-
ity that currently unreliable, but less expensive, technology may
someday prove reliable. It is more probable, however, that the failure
to implement rigorous NIDA standards was the result of intense lob-
bying efforts by the large number of drug testing facilities that are
not NIDA certified. One commentator even argued that the Senate
bill "seems to be using the need for regulation of drug testing labora-
tories as a guise to prevent states from adopting legislation that pro-
vides protection from abusive drug testing practices."2 8
The statutory scheme that Senate Bill 2695 would have estab-
lished as the exclusive remedy for violation of the Act was also inad-
equate. This remedial scheme resembled that of the National Labor
Relations Act (hereinafter NLRA) where weak remedies do not ef-
fectively deter violations."8 9 The provisions failed to provide ade-
quate redress for employees who were being asked to submit to a
search and to perhaps jeopardize their future careers. These employ-
ees at least have a right to insist on the reliability and confidentiality
of the drug testing process. They should also have a right to ade-
quate recourse to the courts in a civil action for violations and to
remedies not within the scope of Senate Bill 2695.
The bill would also have expanded random testing to a large
category of "sensitive employee positions."'2 90 "Sensitive" positions
would have included those "affecting such matters as national secur-
ity, health, or safety, environment, or other responsibilities requiring
287. Letter from Kirk West, President of the California Chamber of Commerce, to Cal-
ifornia Assembly Member Klehs (July 21, 1986) (noted in Thomas McGovern, Employee
Drug-Testing Legislation: Redrawing the Battlelines in the War on Drugs, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1453, 1474 n.101 (1987)).
288. ZEESE, supra note 7, § 1.05(1).
289. See AMERICAN LABOR POLICY: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE NATIONAL LA-
BOR RELATIONS ACT (Charles J. Morris ed., 1985). Morris stated that "the Board's dismal
record in failing to provide meaningful remedies in the cases where violations are found, sup-
ports the conclusion that the Board has failed in its primary mission." Id. at 350. See also
Morris Kleiner, Unionism and Employer Discrimination: Analysis of 8(aX3) Violations, 23
INDUS. REL. 234, 240 (1984). Kleiner's study, which was based on a regression analysis of
National Labor Relations Board case data from 1970 to 1980, determined that "firms that
committed past violations were twice as likely to commit further violations." Id. Kleiner ob-
served that weak remedies did not deter repeat violations. Id. He noted that illegal tactics may
"be [a] cost effective strategy because the significant benefits in the chilling effect on union
organization effort," id. at 327, may outweigh "marginal costs" of penalties, id.
290. S. 2695, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2604(5) (1990).
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a high degree of trust and confidence." 29' Reference to such broadjob categories as those that affect the "environment" 92 and require a
"high degree of ... confidence" '93 seem to evoke Justice Scalia's dire
warning that drug testing could spread to employees of every level
who come in contact with "sensitive" information. Legislation such
as Senate Bill 2695 is ill-advised; it fails to adequately balance the
rights of employees and the needs of employers.
B. House Bill 33
House Bill 33, on the other hand, provides much needed federal
legislation in the area of regulation of drug testing laboratories. Un-
like Senate Bill 2695, the requirements adopted in the House bill are
"more rigid and more precise than the industry's self-regulatory
standards."" 4 Although this bill provides rigorous testing standards,
its major defect is that it preempts state legislation. The existence of
federal standards should not preclude states from exceeding these
standards. Federal regulatory standards should be a floor, not a ceil-
ing for the states.2"'
C. Iowa, Vermont, Rhode Island, and Montana Drug Testing
Laws
The drug testing legislation enacted in Iowa, Vermont, Rhode
Island, and Montana attempts to protect employees' privacy rights
and to address quality control problems.296 The legislation in these
states, however, merely requires probable cause for testing but does
not establish any requirements for supervisor training and documen-
tation.297 Daniel Boone, a San Francisco labor lawyer for unions,
stated: "One of the biggest problems we have experienced with drug
testing programs [is that] employees are required to submit a urine
sample based on the vague and unsubstantiated allegations of some
untrained supervisor.""98 The drug testing legislation in the four
291. Id. § 2614(g).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. ZEESE, supra note 7, § 1.05(1).
295. See infra notes 330-42 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 168.
298. Letter from Daniel Boone, partner of Van Bourg, Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld,
to David Aroner, Executive Director, Social Services Union, Local 535 (Nov. 3, 1989) (on file
with SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW). In his letter, labor lawyer Daniel Boone provides scien-
tific background, legal analysis, and bargaining advice for union representatives dealing with
the drug testing issue. The letter also contains a draft of a model union proposal on drug and
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states fails to establish safeguards which eliminate this problem.
Documentation and training are important if management is to
withstand employee disciplinary challenges and if employees' rights
are to be protected. Boone stated:
[Tihe people empowered to demand drug testing [should] be
trained about the signs of drug use, and ... be required to write
down the specific reasons supposedly justifying the drug testing
... . In practice, the biggest disputes . . . [in] drug related
discipline, or drug testing cases, are questions of the conduct,
behavior or symptoms of the individual employee. It is for this
reason that we cannot stress too much the importance [of in-
cluding] in any drug testing program . . . a requirement that
information concerning the individual employee be written
down at the time, or shortly after, the observations. 20
The drug testing legislation enacted in Iowa, Vermont, Rhode
Island, and Montana also fails to establish cut-off levels for a posi-
tive test. These levels can vary widely.300 The lower the cut-off
point, the more likely it is that there will be an inaccurate result."0
The higher the cut-off point, the less likely it is that a test will mea-
sure positive because of passive inhalation of marijuana.302 The fail-
ure to include specific cut-off points for each drug tested is a major
flaw in the legislation of the four states.
C. Implied Preemption
1. French v. Pan Am Express
State drug testing statutes and constitutional provisions that af-
ford heightened protection for workers should not be impliedly pre-
empted by federal legislation, absent compelling evidence of congres-
sional purpose. The reasoning in cases such as French v. Pan Am
Express,03 which find implied preemption despite compelling evi-
dence of congressional objectives, is flawed and its implications are
disturbing. In a breathtaking leap of logic, the court in French found
that a Rhode Island statute prohibiting random drug testing was
preempted by a federal regulation prohibiting individuals who use
alcohol testing. Id.
299. Id.
300. ZEESE, supra note 7, § 2.01(4).
301. Id.
302. Id. Each test has a cut-off point. When the concentration of a substance tested is
below the cut-off point it will register negative. If the substance tests equal to or above the cut-
off point it will register positive. Id.
303. French v. Pan Am Express, 869 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1989).
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drugs from serving as crew members on civil aircraft.804 Instead of
demonstrating how the state statute "stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress,"308 "actually conflicts with federal law,"830 or occupies the
drug testing field, 07 the court relied on policy arguments that echo
the Bush administration's fears of inconsistent state drug laws.808 Al-
though the court did acknowledge that the objectives of the state and
federal law were not in conflict and were, in fact, complementary, it
did not arrive at the logical conclusion that there was no implied
preemption. 0 9 Having made the leap from the federal statute to the
congressional objective of eliminating inconsistent state drug testing
laws, the court had no difficulty concluding that there was implied
preemption even though there was no inconsistency between the state
"just cause" provision for drug testing and the federal statute. 10
This case represents some of the worst aspects of result-oriented de-
cisions where logic is sacrificed on the altar of expediency.
2. Associated Industries v. Snow
A much more reasoned approach to implied preemption is re-
flected in Associated Industries of Massachusetts v. Snow.8" In As-
sociated Industries, the court refused to find implied preemption of a
state's police powers absent "compelling evidence that this was the
manifest purpose of Congress." '812 Unlike the court in French, the
court in Associated Industries focused on the "states' historic power
to regulate health and safety" '13 and applied a presumption in favor
of state law in these areas. " The court in Associated Industries also
recognized that implied preemption rests on inference and that the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress can rarely be deduced from
inference.31 5 The court in French was willing to find implied pre-
304. Id. at 7.
305. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
306. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983).
307. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
308. French, 869 F.2d at 6.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 7.
311. Associated Indus. of Mass. v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1990).
312. Id. at 282.
313. Id. (quoting Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. New York City, 855 F.2d 48,
58 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted)).
314. Id.
315. Id.
1993]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
emption on much more tenuous evidence of congressional intent than
the clear and manifest purpose required by the Associated Industries
court. The French court found implied preemption despite an ab-
sence of conflicting state and federal laws;316 the Associated Indus-
tries court found no preemption because there was no conflict be-
tween state and federal laws.
3 17
The reasoning in Associated Industries is much more persua-
sive than that in French. In the drug testing area where employee
privacy concerns are implicated, where drug testing labs are largely
unregulated, and where an employee's career can be permanently
destroyed by error, implied preemption of protective state statutes
should not be found, absent compelling evidence of a clear and mani-
fest congressional purpose.
D. Express Preemption
1. The Problem of Inconsistent Legislation
The court in French relied on the specter of inconsistent state
legislation to find implied preemption of a state's drug testing law.
The problem of inconsistent state legislation looms large to propo-
nents of express preemption and critics of state drug testing laws that
contain heightened protection for employees. President Bush, a critic
of these statutes, argues for consistent legislation because of the diffi-
culty for large corporations that cross state lines. 8' In its Proposed
Model Substance Abuse Testing Act, the Institute of Bill of Rights
Law of The College of William and Mary echoes the President's
concerns: "The uneven patchwork of state and federal legislation
creates a maze of conflicting regulations, placing a considerable bur-
den on corporations doing business in interstate commerce." ' 9 Bur-
dens on businesses, however, have not deterred corporations from
conducting interstate commerce. Lack of uniformity has not caused a
problem for business in the area of tort, contract, insurance, or even
regulations that govern incorporation. State OSHA coexists with fed-
eral OSHA and often provides greater protection for employees in
the area of workplace safety. 20 State fair employment practices stat-
316. French, 869 F.2d at 6.
317. Associated Indus., 898 F.2d at 283.
318. See supra note 11.
319. Rodney A. Smolla, Proposal For a Substance Abuse Testing Act: The Report of
the Task Force on the Drug-Free Workplace, Institute of Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 5, 8 (1991).
320. See, e.g., Associated Indus., 898 F.2d at 274.
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utes can provide wider protection from discrimination and stiffer
penalties than Title VII. 21 California has a state law that requires
an employer to make a good faith effort to put a pregnant employee
back in the same job or in a comparable job when she returns to
work.322 This law affords more protection for a pregnant employee
than is required under Title VII,3" 3 places a burden on the em-
ployer, and impinges on management rights. Yet laws such as this do
not prevent corporations from doing business in the state.
Moreover, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(hereinafter ERISA) 24 experience teaches that preemption might
cause the very problem it was designed to eliminate. Differing inter-
pretations of the federal statute have created conflicts in the circuits
that have gone unresolved since the legislation was enacted in
1974.825 The Supreme Court has yet to step in to resolve the con-
flicts. At least one circuit permitted a return to state common law
rules of construction, "either as a matter of congressional intent, or
as a matter of sound judicial policy,"32 6 in order to avoid confusion,
321. See, e.g., California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
322. Id. at 275. California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (hereinafter FEHA),
CAL. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 12900 - 12906 (West 1980 and Supp. 1986), is a comprehensive
statute that prohibits discrimination in employment and housing. In September 1978, Califor-
nia amended the FEHA to proscribe certain forms of employment discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy by adding subsection (b)(2) to § 12945. Guerra, 479 U.S. 275. This section
requires California employers to reinstate an employee returning from such pregnancy leave to
the job she previously held, unless it is no longer available due to business necessity. In the
latter case, the employer must make a reasonable good-faith effort to put the employee in a
substantially similar job. Id. at 276. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e - 2000e-17., prohibits various forms of employment discrimination, including employ-
ment discrimination based on sex. In 1978 Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(hereinafter PDA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The PDA added subsection (k) to § 701, the defi-
nitional section of Title VII. Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was added to the defini-
tion of sex discrimination. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 277. There is no provision in Title VII con-
cerning reinstatement of employees after pregnancy leave. d. In Guerra, the Court found that
Title VII did not preempt the California statute because it is not inconsistent with the pur-
p oses of the federal statute and it does not require the employer to do any act which is unlaw-
ful under Title VII. Id. at 292.
323. Id.
324. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1101 (1974).
325. See, e.g., Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 898 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir.
1990) (rejecting a uniform federal rule of construction for insurance contracts under ERISA
and returning to state laws of construction); Newell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 725 F.
Supp. 1233, 1242 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (discussing conflicts in the circuits concerning degree of
delegation of discretion that triggers an arbitrary and capricious standard of review of an ad-
ministrator's decision instead of a de novo review).
326. Kunin, 898 F.2d at 1427. Although ERISA provides in sweeping terms for the
preemption of " 'any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan.' " Id. at 1426 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)), the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Kunin was convinced that "Congress meant to leave state laws regulating insur-
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achieve statewide uniformity for insurance contracts, and not frus-
trate the settled expectations of the parties.82 The Institute of Bill of
Rights Law advocates federal legislation because of the current "vol-
atile legal picture in which it is impossible to predict with confidence
what types of drug-testing programs courts will or will not ap-
prove."8" 8 Federal drug testing legislation might create such chaos
that we long for a return to the "volatile legal picture" '829 of today
where at least state laws afford protection and reliability.
2. States Serve as Social Laboratories
Even if federal legislation is enacted that is clear and unambig-
uous, preemption is not the appropriate way to deal with the drug
problem. Drugs are a relatively new social problem and state legisla-
tion is fairly recent. Justice Brandeis wrote:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a
grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be
fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risks to the rest
of the country.88 0
One commentator argues that "when something new like drug
testing comes into American society, our states should be used as
laboratories for how social policy and law should respond. To have
the federal government step in at this stage would be imprudent as it
would prevent the development of drug testing policies." '881 In an
area such as drug testing that involves a careful balancing of individ-
ual rights and governmental interests, the state is the proper place to
attain the right balance.
ance contracts perfectly intact." Id. The court feared the adverse effect on commercial relation-
ships of a uniform federal rule of construction that is applicable only to insurance contracts
that relate to employee benefits and to no other insurance contracts. The court was concerned
about the settled expectations of members of the insurance bar and concluded that statewide
uniformity for all insurance contracts was more important than nationwide uniformity for only
some of them. Id. at 1427.
327. Id.
328. Smolla, supra note 319.
329. Id.
330. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
331. ZEESE, supra note 7, § 1.05(1).
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3. States Encourage Participatory Decision Making
In his discussion of federalism and environmental policy, Pro-
fessor Richard Stewart identifies four positive features of decision
making at the state level:
The greater accuracy with which a local decision maker can
operate as utilitarian calculator of costs and benefits; the greater
protection of liberty which the state's decentralized decision
making affords by making it harder for any one group to seize
total national power; the greater degree of community fostered
by the opportunity for political participation that decentraliza-
tion makes possible; and the greater diversity which decentrali-
zation fosters.8 82
Another commentator insists that "the existence of participatory
politics on the state level [is] by no means a fiction." 3 ' He argues
that the "most traditional American mechanism of participatory de-
mocracy - the town meeting - is very much alive ... [as is the refer-
endum,] the most powerful tool of direct government . . .-. "
Even employer oriented groups see the advantages of decentral-
ized decision making at the state level in the area of drug testing. If
forced to choose between state and federal drug testing legislation,
Detroit corporate attorney Henry Saad stated: "I'd rather it be the
state - which is closer to the people, and where employers through
their political arms like the Chamber [of Commerce] can have more
of an impact on what the state legislature is doing.1335 Drug testing
is also an area where a utilitarian calculation of costs and benefits
must be made. A major concern with urine tests is their cost.836 State
lawmakers can more effectively determine whether the results justify
the high cost of drug testing.
4. State Constitutions and Statutes Safeguard Rights
In an article in the Harvard Law Review, 3 7 Justice William
Brennan emphasized the importance of state constitutional protection
332. Stewart, supra note 228, at 1210-1211, quoted in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 385 (1988).
333. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federal-
ism after Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 341, 400, quoted in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 137 (1991).
334. Id.
335. McClenahen, supra note 228, at 53.
336. See supra note 38.
337. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
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of individual rights. He contended that without the independent pro-
tective force of state constitutions the full realization of our liberties
cannot be guaranteed. 8' He argued that states have a responsibility
to separately define and protect the rights of their citizens. 3 9 Justice
Brennan emphasized that states are more and more "construing state
constitutional counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as
guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection than the
federal provisions." 40 He attributed this development to the erosion
of rights in recent Supreme Court decisions and urged state courts to
interpret their common law, statutes, and constitutions to guarantee
and protect individual rights. 4 '
In the drug testing area, states have reacted to a perceived inad-
equacy of federal safeguards by enacting statutes and constitutional
provisions that protect employees' rights. Justice Brennan stated that
"one of the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a
double source of protection for the rights of our citizens."3 4" When
state drug testing statutes and constitutional safeguards are pre-
empted, the state half of that protection is hobbled.
Because of the hysteria that surrounds the drug testing issue, it
is critical that programs be implemented in an environment where
diverse opinions are weighed and balanced rationally. It is easy to
forget the high price we may be paying in the erosion of rights when
the dialogue is couched in military metaphors and when no price is
too high to pay for victory. At the local level, the opportunity for
participation is greater and voices can be heard that may be able to
focus the dialogue on the most effective means to deal with the social
problem that confronts us. Moreover, since this is something we
must all tackle together, the greater degree of community fostered by
local participation may lead to a co-operative effort to eradicate the
drug problem. Prohibition teaches that it is impossible to eradicate a
social problem from the top down when the people do not have the
will to change.
If states determine that drug testing is desirable and opt for a
reasonable cause prerequisite to testing, legislation must contain pro-
visions that require supervisor training and adequate documentation.
In order to achieve adequate quality control in the collection and
testing of urine, rigorous laboratory standards must be maintained,
338. Id. at 491.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 495.
341. Id. at 503.
342. Id.
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cut-off levels must be made explicit, and collection and transporta-
tion procedures must maintain the integrity of the specimen. We
cannot afford to permit employees to be victims of inaccurate testing
and haphazard procedures.
IV. PROPOSAL
Bills such as Senate Bill 2695 which expressly preempt state
legislation in the drug testing area are ill-advised. Moreover, state
drug testing statutes and constitutional privacy provisions that afford
heightened protection to workers should not be impliedly preempted
absent compelling evidence of congressional purpose. Instead, the
state should, in the words of Justice Brandeis, "serve as a labora-
tory" 4" for the development of public policy and law to -solve social
and economic problems.
Legislators at the state level can deal more effectively with the
drug testing problem and determine the best way to balance the
needs of employees and employers without eroding fundamental lib-
erties. In the past, states have balanced competing interests by devel-
oping such innovations as "sunset legislation, zero based budgeting,
equal housing, no fault insurance and the senior executive service" a44
and by "pioneering actions in gun control, pregnancy benefits for
working women, limited access highways, education for handicapped
children, auto pollution standards and energy assistance for the
poor." '3
45
Narrowly tailored federal legislation regulating drug testing
laboratories is needed. According to one commentator, there are
"probably more government regulations to open a hot dog stand than
to open a drug testing laboratory." 4" But, any legislation in this
area should not preclude more rigorous state standards.
The legislation enacted in Iowa, Vermont, Montana, and
Rhode Island attempts to safeguard employee rights and the integrity
of the testing process.3 47 All four states contain general provisions
that permit testing only for reasonable cause. 48 However, such pro-
343. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
344. ADVISORY COMMISSION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE QUESTION
OF STATE GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY 23-24 (1985), quoted in GEOFFREY R. STONE, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 135 (1991).
345. Id.
346. See supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 168.
348. Daniel Boone, supra note 298. The language on supervisor training is based on
§ 11 of the model Union Proposal Regarding Drug and Alcohol Abuse and Drug Testing
19931
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visions may mean that employees are subjected to drug testing based
on vague allegations by untrained supervisors. Legislation must es-
tablish safeguards so that all parties know the basis for any testing.
Drug testing legislation should contain the following provision on
supervisor training:
The employer shall develop a program of training to assist all
supervisors in identifying factors which constitute reasonable
cause for drug testing. The employer shall provide supervisors
with a detailed explanation of the drug policy with emphasis on
the terms and conditions of the policy. Supervisors shall also
receive instruction in completing an incident report form."
The following definition of reasonable cause should also be con-
tained in drug testing legislation:
Reasonable Cause-Reasonable cause shall exist only when two
supervisors, who are trained in detection of drug use, articulate
and can substantiate in writing specific behavioral, performance,
or contemporaneous physical indicators of being under the in-
fluence of drugs or alcohol on the job. The objective indicator
shall be recognized and accepted symptoms of intoxication or
impairment caused by drugs or alcohol, and shall be indicators
not reasonably explained as resulting from causes other than the
use of such controlled substances (such as, but not by way of
limitation, fatigue, lack of sleep, side effects of prescription or
over-the-counter medications, reaction to noxious fumes or
smoke). Cause is not reasonable, and thus not a basis for test-
ing, if it is based solely on the observations and reports of third
parties. The grounds for reasonable cause must be documented
by the use of an Incident Report Form. The incident report
form shall contain the date, time, location of the incident, the
supervisor's observations, the employee's explanation, and the
names of witnesses. The following may constitute reasonable
cause to believe that an employee is under the influence of drugs
or alcohol:
1. Incoherent, slurred speech;
2. Odor of alcohol on the breath;
3. Staggering gait, disorientation, or loss of balance;
4. Red and watery eyes, if not explained by environmental
causes;
5. Paranoid or bizarre behavior;
contained in the letter from Daniel Boone to David Aroner on file with SANTA CLARA LAW
REVIEW.
349. Id. Union Proposal Regarding Drug and Alcohol Abuse and Drug Testing,
§ 5(C).
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6. Unexplained drowsiness."'
Legislation must also be designed to assure that all appropriate
safeguards are followed once the urine sample is given. The follow-
ing procedures should be contained in drug testing legislation to en-
sure the reliability and integrity of the collection and testing of
samples:
A. The testing shall be done by a laboratory licensed and
certified by the state department of health as a medical and fo-
rensic laboratory which complies with the Scientific and Tech-
nical Guidelines for Federal Drug Testing Programs and the
standards for certification of laboratories engaged in urine drug
testing for Federal Agencies issued by the Alcohol, Drug Abuse,
and Mental Health Administration of the United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services.
B. At the time the urine specimens are collected, three sep-
arate samples shall be placed in separate containers. All samples
must be immediately sealed in the presence of the employer, an
employee, and a witness, and the tape signed by the employer,
the employee, and the witness. Two samples, each in a separate
container, shall be sent to the laboratory to be tested at the em-
ployer's expense. In order to be considered positive, both sam-
ples shall be tested separately in separate batches and show pos-
itive results on the GC/MS confirmatory test. The third sample
shall be collected in a separate container and made available to
the employee for testing by a licensed laboratory at the em-
ployee's expense.
C. Urine shall be obtained directly in a tamper-resistant
urine bottle.
D. If the sample must be collected at a site other than the
drug testing laboratory, the specimen shall then be placed in a
transportation container. The container shall be sealed in the
employee's presence and the employee asked to initial or sign
the container. The container shall be sent to the designated test-
ing laboratory on that day or the earliest business day by the
fastest available method.
E. A chain of possession form shall be completed by the
hospital, laboratory and/or clinic personnel during the specimen
collection and attached to and mailed with the specimen."'
Cut-off levels for positive tests must be provided for all drugs tested.
350. Id. Union Proposal Regarding Drug and Alcohol Abuse and Drug Testing,
§ 8(A),(B).
351. Id. Union Proposal Regarding Drug and Alcohol Abuse and Drug Testing,
§ 8(C). The measurements are in nanograms per milliliter.
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The following standards should be contained in drug testing
legislation:
SUBSTANCE SCREENING TEST CONFIRMATION
AMPHETAMINE 500 ng/ml amphetamine 500 ng/ml GC/MS
GROUP
COCAINE 300 ng/ml metabolite 300 ng/ml GC/MS
OPIATES 300 ng/ml morphine 300 ng/ml GC/MS
PHENCYCLIDINE (PCP) 75 ng/ml 75 ng/ml GC/MS
MARIJUANA 100 ng/ml 100 ng/ml GC/MS
(delta 9-THC)
BARBITURATES 300 ng/ml
Drug testing legislation can never safeguard employees' rights
or ensure reliability without provisions that maintain the integrity of
the collection and testing procedures and require screening and con-
firmatory tests with cut-off levels that decrease the likelihood of inac-
curate results.
V. CONCLUSION
There is certainly a need for comprehensive regulation of drug
testing laboratories such as House Bill 33 which proposes state-of-
the-art standards. But like Title VII and OSHA legislation, federal
laboratory regulation should not preclude state legislatures from ex-
ceeding those standards. However, federal legislation such as the
Hatch Bill will merely exacerbate the problems we are facing in the
drug area because the bill adopts inadequate laboratory regulation,
defines sensitive positions broadly, introduces a toothless statutory
scheme to redress violations, and then preempts state safeguards.
The lack of uniform legislation is a small sacrifice to make in an
area where we are still trying to create the right balance between
individual privacy rights and governmental interests. The states can
provide a valuable laboratory for determining the most effective way
to eliminate this serious social problem without undermining impor-
tant social values and individual rights. But state legislation can only
be effective if adequate safeguards and rigorous standards are main-
tained. The hysteria surrounding drug testing should not obscure the
fact that we may be paying too high a price to win the war on drugs.
Ruth Silver Taube
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